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B. G. Hansen*

Inherent Vice and Contracts for
the Sale of Goods

1. Introduction
The question of who is to bear the loss from the natural deterioration
of goods during shipment to a consignee is one that has caused
considerable trouble for Commonwealth courts. Even within
Canada, where there has been a certain amount of judicial
comment, the issue remains to be finally determined. Moreover,
most of the local authority is dated to the extent that it is generally to
be found in pre 1930 reports.' This note is an attempt to outline
briefly the current state of the law as to the allocation of loss caused
by inherent vice in the course of transit and make some suggestions
2
as to the directions in which it might develop.

2. The Existence of an Implied Condition
At first glance, one might expect that as a general rule the buyer
should bear such loss in a contract for the sale of goods. There are
several reasons for this initial reaction. The doctrine of caveat
emptor would seem to be applicable as a preliminary matter of
principle. Moreover, the issue will almost inevitably arise in the
context of c.i.f., c. & f., f.a.s. and f.o.b. contracts. Under these
agreements the seller has an express obligation to put alongside or
on board goods which are at that time in accordance with the
3
contract provisions and which are appropriately packed for transit.
*B. G. Hansen, Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. For a general summary of authorities see 34 Can. Abr. (2nd) 278-279.
2. "By the expression vice, I do not, of course, mean moral vice in the thing itself
or its owner, but only that sort of vice which by its internal development tends to
the destruction or the injury of the animal or thing to be carried, and which is likely
to lead to such a result." Blower v. Great Western Railway Co. (1872), L.R. 7
C.P. 655, 662 per Willes J. For example, excess moisture in a cargo of wheat
.which causes mildew.
3. See Stead & Chisholm v. Williams, [1955] 5 D.L.R. 292 (Nfld. S.C.) where
Dunfield J. implied a condition as to appropriate packing in a contract involving
shipment f.o.b. rail. Also Can. Win. A. Rogers Ltd. v. Lucerne Metal & Plastic
ProductsLtd., [1949] O.R. 135 (C.A.); Van Zonnefeld & Co. v. Gilchrist (1915),
8 O.W.N. 4.

Inherent Vice and the Sale of Goods 169

Thereafter, as a general rule the purchaser bears the risk. 4 Finally, it
is expressly provided in the Sale of Goods Act 5 that:
where the seller of goods agrees to deliver them at his own risk at a
place other than where they are sold, the buyer must, nevertheless,
unless otherwise agreed, take any risk of deterioration in the goods
necessarily incident to the course of transit.

Here the Act contemplates that the responsibility for losses
incidental to transit are to be borne by the buyer even where the
seller delivers at his own risk. One would have thought that in the
case of a sales contract where the buyer generally accepts the
responsibility for losses from at least the time of shipment the same
rule would apply.
The problem, however, is more complex than appears initially. In
those cases where the risk of deterioration would normally be on the
consignee 6 a distinction has been drawn between two classes of
loss, both of which fall within the broad classification of
'destruction by an inherent vice.' 7 On the one hand, where all goods
of the contract specifications would necessarily suffer a certain
amount of deterioration in transit and have deteriorated no more
than would be expected under the circumstances in question, the
purchaser must bear the loss. On the other hand, where some goods
of the contract class would bear transportation with no loss, while

4. See as to the general question of the passing of property and risk, Comptoir

d'Achat v. Luis de Ridder, [1949) A.C. 293, 309; Ireland v. Livingston (1872), 5
H.L. 395,406.
5. Sale of GoodsAct, R.S.N.S. 1967, c.274, s. 34.
6. Where the risk is normally on the vendor the Sale of Goods Act plus the agreed
allocation of risk cover the problem. The following discussion is still important,
however, in determining what nature of loss the Sale of Goods Act intends to
exempt the vendor from. See Winnipeg Fish Company v. The Whitman Fish
Company (1909), 41 S.C.R. 453; Also, D. H. Bain Ltd. v. Beaver Specialty Ltd.,
[1970]2 O.R. 555 (C.A.); (1974), 39 D.L.R. (3d) 574 (S.C.C.). Fridman, Sale of
Goods in Canada (1973) at p. 288 gives the impression that the case is an example
of the operation of Section 34. With respect, it appears clear from the facts that the
loss was not incidental to the transit but caused by the carrier's negligence and that
on the facts the express risk was on the buyer. This is made particularly clear in the
Supreme Court judgment.
7. In insurance cases there is no distinction made and any loss from inherent vice
generally has the same result. This is due to the doctrine ofproxima causa applied
in such cases by which the immediate efficient cause and not the causa remota is
looked to by the courts in determining cause of any loss. See Leyland Shipping Co.
v. Norwich Union Society, [1918] A.C. 350. Note the exceptions to this rule where
the carrier's negligence or the assured's wilful misconduct has 'remotely' caused
the loss.
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others, because of an inherent defect peculiar to them - and not
7a
their genre - do not, the vendor accepts the risk of transit.
The following observation of Diplock J. in Mash & Murrell Ltd
v. Joseph I. Emanuel 8 illustrates this distinction:
It is only the extraordinary deterioration of the goods due to abnormal
conditions experienced during transit for which the buyer takes the risk.
A necessary and inevitable deterioration [i.e., one occasioned by the
nature of the goods themselves] during transit which will render them9
unmerchantable on arrival, is normally one for which the seller is liable
The trend of decisions would, in other words, seem to suggest that
there is an implied condition that goods should remain of
merchantable quality from the time of shipment, throughout a
normal transit to the destination, and thereafter a reasonable time
for disposal. In Mash & Murrell Ltd., it was held that such a
condition was to be implied in c.i.f. and c. & f. contracts. Twenty
years previously, Hilbery J. had come to the same conclusion. In

Broome v. PardessCo-operativeSociety 10 his Honour commented:
These words seem to me to be strong enough to show that what is
fundamental is that the goods must be merchantable, and, where they
are perishable goods, and the contract contemplates they have a transit
to undergo, merchantable not only at the beginning of the transit,
though that would appear to be the place of delivery under the contract,
but they must be merchantable in the sense that, at the place for delivery
under the contract, they are in a suitable and fit condition for the transit
normally to be expected. 11
Canadian courts have generally accepted this approach and placed
the responsibility for loss in such circumstances on the vendor. For

example, in Sims Packing Co. Ltd. v. Corkum & Ritcey Ltd. 12 the
plaintiffs were pork packers in Charlottetown and the defendants
butchers in Halifax. The latter purchased ham and bacon from the

7a. Sassoon, "Deterioration of Goods in Transit," [1962] J.B.L. 351, 354.
8. [1961] 1 W.L.R. 862. Reversed on appeal on the facts, [1962)1 W.L.R. 16.
9. Ibid., at p. 871. One should perhaps add that any necessary deterioration to the
class as opposed to a particular shipment, such as necessary shrinkage, would also
be at the buyer's risk even on a normal voyage.
10. [1939] 3 All E.R. 978. Overruled by the Court of Appeal on a point of
evidence, (1940), 56 T.L.R.430.
It.Ibid., at p. 985. Also Beer v. Walker (1877), 46 L.J.Q.B. 677; Healy v.
Howlett & Sons, [1917] 1 K.B. 337, 347per Ridley J.; Ollett v. Jordan, [1918] 2
K. B. 41, 46per Darling J. and 47-49per Atkin J.
12. (1920), 53 N.S.R. 539. See also Tregunno v. Aldershot, [1944] 1 D.L.R. 102,
107 per Laidlaw J.A.; Hebb v. Stoddard [1935] 4 D.L.R. 394, 395-396 per
Roberts Co. Ct. J. Cf. Stead & Chisholm v. Williams [1955] 5 D.L.R. 292, 293per
Dunfield J.
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plaintiff which, when delivered, was 'slimy, wormy and unfit for
food'. The Nova Scotia Supreme Court held there was an implied
condition in the contract of sale that the goods would be fit to
withstand the shipment from Charlottetown and a reasonable time
thereafter.
Nevertheless, while the bulk of authority would seem to support
the legitimacy of the implied term, this view is not universally
accepted. The attitude of one writer 13 is that while the seller should
be held liable for any inevitable deterioration resulting from
insufficient packing of goods or from his employing insufficient
means of conveyance, he should not be liable otherwise for loss
during transit generated by the nature of the goods themselves. Any
implied condition as to fitness for transportation extends only to the
condition of the goods when they leave the sellers possession. 14
There is some judicial support for this view. In Bowden Bros. &
Co. Ltd. v. Little, 15 a cargo of onions, merchantable with respect to
condition and quality at departure, was found to have rotted during
the voyage and be unfit for sale. The High Court of Australia held
that the existence of any implied condition was a question of fact
depending on all the circumstances whether, and to what extent, the
purchaser relied on the judgement of the vendor to supply goods fit
for the purpose of shipment. It was definitely not a term to be
implied into every contract for the sale of goods and the Court
implied strongly that it would be uncommon in a c.i.f. based
agreement. The possibility of the existence of such a condition was
not, however, ruled out. The important point was that it was not to
be implied from the mere fact of shipment and that having regard to
the nature of c.i.f. contracts positive proof of reliance on the seller
must be shown. In Oleificio Zucchi S.P.A. Ltd. v. Northern Sales
Ltd. 16 Mr. Justice McNair went further than the High Court and
categorically denied the existence of any such condition. Basing his
opinion on the extent of a seller's obligation incurred under a c.i.f.
contract, his Honour stated that the nature of such contracts
13. Sassoon, "Damage Resulting from Natural Decay" (1965), 28 M.L. Rev.
180, 189-192; for fuller comments by the same writer see "Deterioration of Goods
in Transit," [1962] J.B.L. 351.
14. Compare Schmitthoff, The Export Trade (5th. ed., 1969) 71 whose opinion is
consistent with that of the present writer. Also Fridman, op. cit.
15. (1907), 4 C.L.R. 1364. For a short analysis of this case see Sutton, Sale of
Goods in Australia and New Zealand (1967) 142.

16. [1965] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 496.
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precluded the application of an extended 'merchantability' or
17
'fitness for purpose' principle.
It is suggested that in so far as these two streams of authority lay
down any absolute rule of law neither is correct. It must be borne in
mind that at common law the courts will not imply into a written
contract any term that is not both reasonable and necessary. 1 8
Accordingly, the claim that such an implied condition exists in
every sales agreement involving the shipment of goods is difficult to
sustain. At the same time, while c.i.f. and similar contracts do
expressly provide for the allocation of risk, it is surely unreasonable
to expect the purchaser to bear such loss on every occasion. The
rationale of placing the risk of loss on the purchaser is based on
practical considerations. Thus, the buyer, who is usually in the
presence of the carrier and the goods when any damage is
discovered, is generally in a better position than the seller to pursue
an action against the carrier or insurer. Similarly, he is better placed
to attempt any possible salvage. The writer has no argument with
this approach. But, as we shall see, in cases of inherent vice the
former factor is of no importance since the buyer has no right of
action against the carrier or insurer. Moreover, the risks which these
contracts contemplate shall be borne by the consignee are of an
unpredictable or exceptional nature such as those occasioned by the
act of a third party or peril of the sea. In the present context, the
purchaser is being asked to pay for what, in effect, is the default of
the seller. In the final analysis, therefore, any argument based on
the express allocation of risk under a c.i.f. or f.o.b. contract simply
begs the question. The obligation of the seller is to place on board
goods which conform to contract specifications. The problem

before the courts and the present writer is to determine whether one
of the implied contractual specifications is that the goods must be of
such a condition that they will survive a normal transit, even though
any defect may be latent and not discernable for some time.
The answer to this conflict would appear to be that while it would
be extremely difficult to imply such a condition at common law, it

17. Ibid., at 581.
18. And not in conflict with any express terms of the contract. London Export
CorporationLtd. v. Jubilee Coffee Roasting Co. Ltd., [1958] 1 W.L.R. 661, 675;
Les Affriteurs Riunis Socigti Anonyme v. Walford [1919] A.C. 801, 809. For a

decision in the present context see Broome v. Pardess Co-operativeSociety (1940),
56 T.L.R. 430, 432per MacKinnon L.J.
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may be possible for the purchaser to rely on the statutory implied
conditions in the Sale of Goods Act in appropriate cases. 19 The
problem is how to determine what is an appropriate case. It seems
clear that ultimately the issue must be settled on the extent to which
the purchaser did, in fact, rely on the skill and judgment of the
vendor. 2 0 As usual, this enquiry will involve consideration of a
multiplicity of factors. It is suggested, however, that a realistic
starting point can be reached by drawing a basic distinction between
goods of a perishable and non-perishable nature. In normal
circumstances, where both parties are aware that the goods are
likely to deteriorate and the vendor is more acquainted with their
tendencies and the means by which they should be transported, the
Courts are likely to conclude that the purchaser relied on the latter to
supply goods fit for transit. In these circumstances, it can be
accepted that the parties must have intended such a condition to be
implied upon entering the contract. In the case of more resilient
goods, on the other hand, for example, minerals or machinery, it
must be extremely doubtful whether the prospect of deterioration
was ever contemplated by the parties in the course of negotiations.
While English cases have not generally drawn such a positive
distinction 2 ' the above analysis would appear to represent an
accurate interpretation of the authorities. Not unexpectedly, all
reported decisions in which the Courts have implied such a
condition have concerned perishable foodstuffs. Moreover, many of
the Canadian authorities clearly treat the principle as being
applicable only to perishable commodities. 2 2 Thus, in one local
19. See Tregunno v. Aldershot supra, at p. 106, where Laidlaw J. A. was of the

opinion that the implied condition could only arise under the Sale of Goods Act and
not the common law.
20. To this end it would be preferable in the writer's view to treat these cases as
raising a question of 'fitness for purpose' rather than 'merthantibility'. It is
interesting to note that the first major decision in this field was expressly decided on
the 'fitness for purpose' principle. See Beer v. Walker supra. In following this
case, however, subsequent courts have often used the doctrine of 'merchantibility'
to justify their conclusion, eg. Mash & Murrell Ltd. v. Joseph I. Emanuel supra;
Ollett v. Jordansupra;Tregunno v. Aldershot supra. In that the 'fitness for purpose'

implied condition specifically contemplates an enquiry as to reliance on
the seller's skill and judgement, it is submitted that this is a more logical premise to
proceed from. SeeSale of Goods Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 274, s. 16(a).
21. Beer v. Walker supra; Mash & Murrell Ltd. v. Joseph I. Emmanuel Ltd.
supra; Ollett v. Jordan supra. Cf. Broome v. Pardess Co-operative Society,

particularly the passage quoted infra.
22. E.g. Sims Packing Co. Ltd. v. Corkum & Ritcey Ltd. (1920), 53 N.S.R. 539;

174 The Dalhousie Law Journal

decision, 23 the English authorities were distinguished on the basis
that whereas dead rabbits were susceptible to decay, potatoes could
not be placed in the same category. More recently, the judgment in
Mash & Murrell Ltd. has itself been distinguished by an English
Court2 4 by drawing a distinction between potatoes, which are

perishable goods, and animal skins which are not.
It can also be argued that commercial practice as evidenced by
national and international sales terms reflect this approach. While
general international interpretations of customary shipping contracts
do not expressly incorporate any such conditions into sales
contracts, 2 5 several of the more recent international formulations do
indicate that a condition as to inter alia, fitness for the purpose of
shipment, may have to be implied where the damage can be traced
back to the fault or default of the vendor. 2 6 While it may not be
possible to attach responsibility on the seller for damage to a
normally stable cargo, it would seem equitable to find fault in the
latter's conduct where he took insufficient care in the selection of
goods which he knew travelled badly. More importantly, at least
one statute dealing specifically with perishable items does provide
protection for the purchaser in the present circumstances. 2 7 The
Hebb v. Stoddard supra. It should be noted, however, that most of the Canadian
decisions rest on an explicit approval of passages from texts that draw this
distinction. Mayhew v. Scott FruitCompany (1915), 30 W.L.R. 466 appears to be
the only case where the distinction was fully considered. See also the findings in
the Report on Consumer Warrantiesand Guaranteesin the Sale of Goods (Ontario
Law Reform Commission, 1972) 37. Cf. Tregunno v. Aldershot supra, where the
implied condition was apparently accepted as being of general application in the
case of non-specific goods.
23. Mayhew v. Scott FruitCo. ibid., at p. 471 per Stuart J.
24. Cordova Land Co. Ltd. v. Victor Bros. Inc., [1966] 1 W.L.R. 793, 796 per
Winn J.
25. E.g. Incoterms (International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C. Brochure 166,
1953); Trade Terms (I.C.C. Document 16, 1953). For a detailed analysis of these
publications see Sassoon, "Deterioration of Goods in Transit" op. cit., at pp.
357-358.
26. E.g. General Conditions of Delivery of Goods (Comecon Conditions, 1968)
para. 71(2). See also para. 7(2) (b), (3)(b) in which the passing of risk in f.o.b.,
c.i.f. and c. & f. contracts is specifically limited to "the risk of accidental loss or
accidental damage to goods." See the English translation by Hoya and Quigley,
"Comecon 1968 General Conditions for the Delivery of Goods" (1970), 31 Ohio.
S.L.J. 1. Also Uniform Law on the Sale of Goods, 1964, Schedule I, Article 96.
For a discussion of the latter see Graveson, Cohn and Graveson, Uniform Laws on
InternationalSales Act, 1967 (1968).
27. For an excellent general discussion of the risk of loss in transit as evidenced by
international formulations see Schmitthoff, "Risk of Loss in Transit" in J.
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U.S.A. Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act, 1930 provides
that a warranty that goods are in a 'suitable shipping condition' shall
be implied in normal trade terms. Such condition is defined in
section 42.24(j) as:
A condition which if shipment is handled under normal transportation
service and conditions, will assume delivery without deterioration, at
the destination specified in the contact of sale.

This legislation can only be an acknowledgment that, within its
admittedly narrow scope, the existence and acceptance of such a
27
stipulation must necessarily be imputed to the parties. a
The American position does not, overall, provide much
assistance. Sassoon suggests that American jurisprudence does not
generally recognize the extension of the fitness for purpose
condition even with respect to sales of perishable goods. 28 As usual,
however, one can find judicial comments to the contrary. In Philip
Olim & Co. v. C. A. Watson & Sons 2 9 the purchaser bought apples for
resale, to be stored by the seller and shipped upon order of the
purchaser. The evidence showed that the products were in good
condition when transferred to the seller's warehouse, but were in a
Honnold (ed.), Unificationofthe Law GoverningInternationalSales ofGoods (1966)
Chapter 7.
27a. Sassoon, op. cit., at n. 7a. gives the impression that the coverage provided by
this Act is exceptional and that it was introduced to provide some protection for the
buyer. On the contrary, the Act as a whole is designed to clarify the position
generally as between parties dealing in perishable agricultural commodities and
was, in fact, principally motivated by a desire to improve the position of the seller.
Compare the following passage from the judgment of the First Circuit Court of
Appeal inL. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co. Inc., 169 F. 2d. 60 at p. 61
(1948); "The Act was intended to prevent produce from becoming distress
merchandise and to protect sellers who were often at a great distance from the
buyer." See also California Fruit Exchange v. Henry, 89 F. Supp. 580 (1950).
Since the Act contemplates strict limitations on the buyer's right to reject, it seems
reasonable to conclude that at least the right maintained under statute must have
existed in the basic law of sales. Moreover, the Act was not intended to replace the
basic law of sales which remains applicable when the Act does not apply. Fletcher
v. Ozark Packing Co., 188 F. 2d. 858 (1951). For a brief note on the common law
position seepost, at n. 29.
28. (1965), 28 M.L. Rev. 180, 191. See Harp v. Haas Phillips Produce Co., 205
Ala. 573; Fruit Dispatch Co. v. C.C. Taft Co., 197 N.W. 302 (1924); Rhynas v.
Keck, 161 N.W. 486 (1917). Generally, Williston on Sales, (rev. ed.,) para. 245;
47 Am. Jur. para. 350 at p. 535. But compare the second edition, para. 470 at p.
641 where the early reference does not appear.
29. 204 Ala. 179. See also CaliforniaFruitExchange v. Henry, supra, at p. 586;
A. J. Conroy Inc. v. Weyl-Zuckerman & Co., 39 F. Supp. 784 (1941); Ernest E.
FadlerCo. v. Hesser, 166 F. 2d. 904 (1948).
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decaying and unmerchantable state when they arrived at their
ultimate destination. In disposing of the case in favour of the
purchaser, the court said:
So it is a clear implication from the correspondence between the parties
that the apples, being for resale in the usual way, should be in a
condition that would keep them sound and saleable for a reasonable
time for that purpose.
The Uniform Commercial Code does little to clarify the confused
state of the law. Neither the basic implied warranties 30 nor the
sections dealing with c.i.f. and f.o.b. transactions 31 provide any
direct help. Sassoon argues, however, that section 2:321 is of some
assistance. The section reads:
Under a contract containing a term c.i.f. or c. & f.
(1) Where the price is based on or is to be adjusted according to
"net landed weights," "delivered weights", "out turn"
quantity or quality or the like, unless otherwise agreed the seller
must reasonably estimate the price. The payment due on tender
of the documents called for by the contract is the amount so
estimated, but after final adjustment of the price a settlement
must be made with commercial promptness.

(2) An agreement described in sub-section (1) or any warranty of
quality or condition of goods on arrival places upon the seller the
risk of ordinary deterioration, shrinkage and the like in
transportation but has no effect on the place or time of
identification to the contract for sale or delivery or on the
passing of the risk of loss.
The above commentator suggests that this section implies that
unless the parties have expressly agreed on, for instance, a 'net
landed weight', any loss in transit through deterioration to the goods
must be borne by the buyer. This approach completely ignores the
rationale for the provision. It was introduced to deal with variations
of the c.i.f. agreement which are commonly adopted in practice and
is specifically aimed at providing for a shift to the seller of the risk
of quality and weight deterioration during transit without changing
the legal consequences of the c.i.f. contract as to the passing of risk
to the buyer at the time of shipment. 32 The section specifically
contemplates that where a seller warrants, impliedly or expressly,
the quality or condition of goods on arrival he shall bear the risk of
ordinary deterioration, i.e., deterioration which might be expected
because of the nature of goods. The buyer, on the other hand, will
30. Ss. 2:314, 2:315.
31. Ss. 2:320, 2:319.
32. Uniform Commercial Code (1962 Official Text) S. 2:321 comment.
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still bear the risk of loss arising from accidents in the course of
shipment as is usual under such contracts. 33 Section 2:321,
therefore, would appear to be neutral in its effect. It leaves to the
basic risk provisions 3 4 and the implied warranties the question of
whether a warranty as to fitness for shipment exists and the
allocation of loss on breach of such warranty.
In the final analysis, perhaps the most important argument in
favour of the existence of an implied condition in so far as
perishable goods are concerned finds its basis in simple common
sense. It has been implied that such a condition would only be found
rarely in a c.i.f. contract because the buyer will always be covered
by insurance, 3 5 or alternatively, have an action against the carrier.
On the contrary, the protection any normal policy gives will be quite
worthless since, in the absence of express coverage, 3 6 neither the
underwriter3 7 nor the carrier 8 is liable for loss caused by inherent
vice. In the case of goods which normally remain stable in transit
this factor is not particularly relevant. The purchaser will likely
consider that any forseeable loss is covered by his usual policy and
remedies. It must be queried, however, whether any person would
agree to purchase perishable goods which have a well established
tendency to deteriorate without some recourse if they are in fact
damaged by that inherent vice in the course of transit. It can be
assumed that the parties are aware of the lack of a remedy against
the insurer or carrier; this leaves only the vendor to accept
responsibility.
3. Scope and Limitationof the Implied Condition
The major problem to be faced in applying the above analysis will
33. Uniform Commercial Code (Michigan Compiled Laws) S. 2:321 practice
commentary.
34. Ss. 2:509, 2:5 10.
35. Bowden Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. Little (1907),4C.L.R. 1364.
36. Discussion with Halifax insurers involved in the carriage of goods field led the
writer to the conclusion that, to quote one representative, "they avoid express
coverage like the plague." It appears that it is almost never given in inland carriage
and extremely uncommon in the case of marine carriage. Specialist insurers,
however, eg. Lloyd's, may provide coverage for unique cargos, in particular coal,
at a 'substantial premium.'
37. Even where there is an 'all risks' policy. British & Foreign Marine Insurance
Co. v. Gaunt, [1921] 2 A.C. 41.
38. See the Carriageof Goods by Water Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-15, Article N,
s. 2(m).
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be to decide in any particular case what constitutes 'perishable'
goods. In this area, the law is in an absolute state of confusion. On
occasions, distinctions have been drawn between animal carcases
and potatoes, 39 between potatoes and animal skins,40 and oysters
and other perishable foodstuffs. 4 1 As indicated earlier, English and
Canadian authorities have even differed in their conclusion as to
whether the sale of potatoes gives rise to the implied condition. 4 2 As
a general rule the courts appear likely to apply the everyday
meaning of 'perishable', i.e., likely to decay. 4 3 Accordingly, it is
probable that a broad distinction will continue to be drawn between
raw foodstuffs and other products. Yet such an approach does not
provide a totally satisfactory answer. For example, what is the
position with contracts for the sale of coal or tinned pork? These are
products which have a tendency to self-destruct but which, at the
same time, would not normally be classified as perishable items.
The courts can only face this problem by adopting a realistic
approach to interpreting the term 'perishable'. In the writer's view it
should not be construed narrowly but in the light of what the parties
would have contemplated at the time of their negotiations. If the
subject matter of the contract is known to have a tendency to
self-destruct when not in condition fit to survive a normal shipment,
whether the damage be caused by decay, decomposition,
combustion or 'blowing', then it would seem reasonable and
necessary to infer that this factor was something the purchaser relied
on the vendor to guard against. In other words, they should be
regarded as 'perishable goods'. Certainly this is wider than the
normal definition of 'perishable'. Such an approach has the
advantage, however, of according with commercial reality. In the
final analysis, this factor must be the basic requirement of any so
called 'test'. Otherwise, the question being asked by the courts i.e.,
whether the trading parties would have regarded the condition as
being part of the contract, is being asked out of context and the
entire enquiry would be a fiction.
It should not be assumed that the mere fact that the goods are
'perishable' will be enough to persuade the courts that the implied
39. Mayhew v. Scott FruitCo. supra.
40. Cordova Land Company Ltd. v. Victor Bros. Inc. supra.
41. Barnes v. Waugh (1906), 41 N.S.R. 38.
42. Cf. Mash & Murrell Ltd. v. Jospeh I. Emanuel supra, and Mayhew v. Scott
FruitCo. supra.
43. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1973) at p. 1556.
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condition should be read into the contract. While generally it will be
sufficient, there may be other factors that will rebut any
presumption of reliance on the seller's skill and judgment. For
example, the consignee may have express cover for inherent vice in
his insurance policy. Since such coverage is extremely rare and
must have been expressly bargained for, this is likely to be
construed as an indication that he has accepted the risk of loss from
this source. Similarly, a heavily reduced price could be evidence of
an 'as is' attitude. In other cases the consignee may be in t he
position of 'expert' and handle all practical matters himself. For
instance, in Kelly, Douglas & Co. Ltd. v. Pollock44 the purchaser

stipulated that the goods should be sent 'standard heat and vent.'
However, the evidence showed that the cargo in question required a
higher than usual temperature. The Ontario High Court was not
prepared to imply any condition of merchantibility when turnips
rotted as a result of the specified mode of shipment. Clearly, on the
facts, there was no reliance on the seller as the buyer had made all
arrangements for shipping himself.
Further, it would appear that if the implied term is held to exist it
will be limited, in the absence of wording to the contrary, to the
shipment from vendor to purchaser. In Tregunno v. Aldershot 45 the
purchaser asked the court to extend the condition to cover the
quality of goods during shipment to subpurchasers. The approach
adopted by the court provides an excellent illustration of factors
which should properly be taken into account in any enquiry:
While the plainiff knew, or may be taken to have known, that the
defendant required the goods for the purpose of resale and shipment to

its customers, there is no evidence to show that the defendants relied on
the plaintiff's skill or judgement as to the fitness of the goods for such
purposes. On the contrary, the defendants used the skill and judgment
of its own officers or advisors, and exercised its own discretion in the

matter. If it made a mistake and took a chance which a reasonable
shipper would not have taken in the circumstances, it cannot put the
responsibility for any resulting loss on the plaintiff...46
To place such a burden and responsibility on the grower of fruit in the
absence of any express agreement on his part would be unreasonable
and unjust. I venture to think thatfew, if any, growers would be willing
to sell their crops under such conditions. They would demand prices
commensurate with the risk and insist upon
measures specified by them
47
as to the protectionof the goods in transit.
44.
45.
46.
47.

(1958), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 526 (O.H.C.).
[1944)1 D.L.R. 102.
Ibid., at p. 106 per Laidlaw J.A.
Ibid., at p. 108 per Laidlaw J.A.
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These two factors, the relative position of the parties as to expertise
and consequently an absence of reliance on the seller, and the
commercial reality of the situation led the court to conclude that the
implied term should not be given the wider application claimed.
While the condition will not generally extend to subshipments it
does, on the other hand, require the goods to remain in good
condition for a reasonable time after actual delivery to the
purchaser. 4 8 It follows, however, that if the purchaser delays for a
unreasonable period before inspecting the goods and discovering the
deterioration he may well have a difficult time proving that the
perishing occurred in the course of transit and not after arrival. 49 In
these circumstances a court may well deem the goods to have been
shipped and to have arrived in good condition thus satisfying any
implied term. 50
4. Conclusions
In conclusion it appears that in cases of c.i.f., c. & f., f.o.b. and
f.a.s. contracts, loss caused by an inherent defect in the contract
goods should be allocated on the following bases. Where the subject
matter is known to those in the trade to have a tendency to be
damaged by an inherent vice, they should be regarded as 'perishable
goods'. In such circumstances, the courts may be expected to draw
the conclusion, in the absence of any contrary indication of the
parties' intentions, that the purchaser relied on the vendor to supply
goods fit to survive a normal transit. If, as the result of any inherent
vice, the consignment does not reach the purchaser in a reasonable
state and remain so for a reasonable time thereafter, the vendor must
accept responsibility for the loss. On the other hand, if the
deterioration is no more than could be expected to result from the
transit to all goods of the class, e.g. necessary shrinkage, the

48. Mash & Murrell Ltd. v. Jospeh I. Emanuel, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 862, 870per
Diplock J.; Ollett v. Jordan, [1918] 1 K.B. 41, 47-48 per Atkin J.; Sims Packing
Co. Ltd. v. Corkum & Ritcey Ltd. (1920), 53 N.S.R. 539. Cf. Beer v. Walker
(1877), 46 L.J.Q.B. 677, 678: "a reasonable opportunity of dealing with them in
the course of business."
49. Questions relating to the burden of proof are often decisive in cases such as
these which are determined ultimately on matters of evidence. This is a study
worthy in itself of independent treatment and cannot be dealt with in this note. See
generally A. B. Kemp Ltd. & Others v. Tolland, [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 68 1.
50. See, for example, Hebb. v. Stoddard, [1935] 4 D.L.R. 394 (N.S. Co. Ct.);
McLean ProduceCo. v. Freedman (1908), 12 O.W.R. 1038.
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purchaser will bear the loss. Similarly, the latter must accept
responsibility, in accordance with the general rules as to the
transference and allocation of risk, for any damage occasioned by
51
extraordinary incidents of the voyage.
51 Barnes v. Waugh supra, (delay caused by storms and freezing). Davidson v.
Bigelow & Hood Ltd. (1922), 55 N.S.R. 539 (excess heat).

